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Slavonic and East European Review, 97, 4, 2019
Peak Dictatorship: Ceaușescu’s State 
Visit to Great Britain, June 1978
GAVIN BOWD and MIOARA ANTON
The State Visit of Nicolae Ceaușescu to the United Kingdom in June 1978 
has not left commentators indifferent. It has been seen as a dark moment in 
British diplomacy, indulging a regime whose evil nature was fully revealed 
in December 1989.1 The most balanced and well-documented study of this 
notorious high-point of Great Britain’s ‘political romance’ with Romania 
in the 1970s is by Mark Percival, published in 1995. But if Percival provides 
valuable geopolitical and economic insights, he remarks with regret that 
‘it is extraordinarily difficult to establish the exact objectives of British 
foreign policy prior to the release of classified material under the Thirty-
year rule’.2 In this article, we aim to expand upon Percival’s description 
and analysis of this pivotal event, drawing on declassified documents 
in both London and Bucharest, as well as the contemporary press and 
recently published sources. We examine the motivations of both sides and 
the influence of political, geopolitical and economic factors. We argue that 
Ceaușescu’s State Visit marks not only the high-point of Anglo-Romanian 
relations, but also the apogee of his dictatorship, bringing international 
recognition and tangible economic gains.
Ceaușescu at the height of his power
At the beginning of the 1970s, the name of Nicolae Ceaușescu became 
known in all the diplomatic chancelleries of the world. His popularity was 
especially due to his opposition to the Soviet Union, which culminated 
in the public condemnation of the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 
Gavin Bowd is Reader in French at the University of St Andrews and Mioara Anton is a 
senior researcher at the ‘Nicolae Iorga’ Institute of History, Bucharest.
1  See John Sweeney, The Life and Evil Times of Nicolae Ceausescu, London, 1991, pp. 
110–20; Mark Almond, The Rise and Fall of Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu, London, 1992, 
pp. 110–16.
2  Mark Percival, ‘Britain’s “Political Romance” with Romania in the 1970s’, 
Contemporary European History, 4, March 1995, 1, pp. 67–87 (p. 68).
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1968. Romania succeeded in attracting the attention of the Western world 
from 1967 onwards through foreign policy decisions which singled it out 
in the Communist bloc through the almost simultaneous establishment 
of diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
refusal to categorize the state of Israel as aggressor during the Six Day 
War.3 Similarly, the diplomatic tours of Asia (1971), Africa (1972) and Latin 
America (1973), as well as the high-level visits to Bucharest by Western 
leaders (Willy Brandt in August 1967, Charles de Gaulle in May 1968 
and Richard Nixon in August 1969), contributed to the accumulation of 
impressive image capital. To this was added the Bucharest leader’s visits 
to a series of Western capitals, such as Rome, the Vatican, Paris, Vienna 
and Bonn, which led in turn to visits by heads of state, ministers and party 
leaders.4 Campaigns for the organization of the conference for European 
security, appeals for nuclear disarmament and proposals for dismantling 
the military blocs consolidated his international reputation. Also not 
without importance were developments in international relations (East-
West relations, the Sino-Soviet dispute, the USSR’s opening to the West) 
which increased considerably Romania’s room for manoeuvre both within 
and outside the Communist bloc. 
 The development of relations with the Western states was one of the 
main objectives of Ceaușescu’s foreign policy programme. Invoking 
the principle of ‘reciprocal advantage, the respect for independence and 
non-interference in internal affairs’,5 Ceaușescu announced to the Tenth 
Congress of the PCR, in August 1969, that Romania aimed to extend 
economic and technico-scientific links with the Western and developing 
states. Behind this decision were both political (the widening of autonomy 
in the Soviet bloc) economic reasons. The programmes for the country’s 
accelerated industrialization as laid out in his five-year plans explain 
Ceaușescu’s interest in the intensification and diversification of trade 
3  See the assessment by Ceaușescu’s first foreign minister, Corneliu Mănescu, in 
Convorbiri neterminate. Corneliu Mănescu în dialog cu Lavinia Betea, Iași, 2001, pp. 172–73.
4  For example, according to a report by the British ambassador to Bucharest, Leslie 
Glass, for the period January-November 1966, more than 140 Romanian delegations visited 
countries in Europe, Asia, Africa, North America and Australia. In response, more than 152 
foreign delegations had visited Romania. In the ambassador’s view, behind the Romanian 
actions were economic interests. See Mihai Retegan, Ambasadorii Majestății Sale în 
România. Relațiile dintre Regatul Unit și România, 1964–1970, Bucharest, 2017, pp. 203–04.
5  Nicolae Ceaușescu, ‘Raportul Comitetului Central al Partidului Comunist Român 
cu privire la activitatea PCR în perioada dintre Congresul al IX-lea și Congresul al X-lea 
și sarcinile de viitor ale partidului’, in Congresul al X-lea al Partidului Comunist Român, 
6–12 august 1969, Bucharest, 1969, p. 43. 
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relations with the Western states. His objectives were as ambitious as 
they were daring: Ceaușescu wanted to close the technological gap and 
create productive industries that, in the long term, would enable Romania 
to go beyond its status as a developing nation. For this was needed 
advantageous credit, flexibility on the international markets, technological 
and cultural exchanges and access to international trade organizations. 
The liberalization of world trade was an opportunity that Romania had to 
profit from. The first results of his endeavours appeared at the beginning 
of the 1970s, when the Bucharest regime became a member of GATT in 
November 1971, then was formally accepted into the the IMF and the 
IBRD in December 1972. Thanks to these successes, Romania pulled off the 
exploit of being a member of both Comecon and the IMF. But by far the 
biggest success of Ceaușescu was when, in July 1975, President Ford granted 
Romania ‘Most Favoured Nation’ tariff status. 
 However, these foreign policy successes were not echoed in Romania’s 
internal situation. Distancing from Moscow, the cultivation of anti-
Russian sentiment amongst the population, the condemnation of the 
Securitate’s abuses and the rehabilitation of the persecuted had led, in 
the early years, to an increase in Ceaușescu’s popularity and generated 
socially a feeling of trust. Although at the beginning of his leadership, 
through his relaxation of terror and liberalization of the system, Ceaușescu 
seemed to be a reformer, within only a few years he was building the 
road towards absolute dictatorship. Changes took place gradually, but 
inexorably extended his control over the party and state apparatuses. 
The development of the cult of the personality, the ideological freeze that 
came with the Theses of July 1971, the nationalist rhetoric, the propaganda 
excesses and the deterioration of living conditions were defining traits 
of the Ceaușescu regime. The accumulation of party and state offices 
conferred on him absolute power: Ceaușescu took over, in turn, leadership 
of the State Council in 1967, the Socialist Unity Front, created in September 
1968 as a formula for the political organization of society, and the office 
of party general secretary. He was also made supreme commander of the 
armed forces, and became president of the country’s Defence and National 
Workers’ Councils. The formal creation of the dictatorship took place on 
28 March 1974 when, in a special ceremony, Ceaușescu was made President 
of the RSR, taking a sceptre as symbol of presidential power. The Party, 
Securitate and army were now in his hands. So as not to be accused of 
breaking with the principles of collective leadership decided at the Ninth 
Congress in 1965, Ceaușescu institutionalized the accumulation of party 
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and state offices at all levels, which meant that party first secretaries or 
secretaries could hold office as mayors or prefects. At the same time, Elena 
Ceaușescu began to be more present in the political life of Communist 
Romania, accumulating offices in both party and state. The Eleventh 
Congress of November 1974 marked the Bucharest regime’s entry into the 
sign of dynastic Communism.
 At the beginning of 1978, Ceaușescu was reaching the peak of his power, 
with his birthday transformed into a national celebration. The forms of 
glorification of the Conducător reached paroxystic levels. This event was 
analysed attentively by the British Embassy in Bucharest, which reported 
on 8 February: 
The celebration of Ceausescu’s birthday […] merits some closer 
examination. At first sight we have seen the practical expression of a 
personality cult which must have few equals in the world. As a propaganda 
campaign it has been spectacular. The entire country was mobilized to 
pay tribute to the President. There is not an organization or factory in the 
country which has not sent its message of congratulation (and often gifts) 
to the leader. There is not a poet, artist, sculptor, intellectual or historian 
who has not willingly or unwillingly provided his own testimony or loyal 
admiration.6 
 Behind the propaganda campaigns depicting a radiant future hid 
social realities that Ceaușescu ignored until his fall in December 1989. 
The Romanian economy began to show obvious signs of crisis from the 
beginning of the 1970s. Romania was affected by a series of natural disasters 
(two waves of flooding in May 1970 and July 1975, and an earthquake 
in March 1977), which led to a worsening of the economic situation. 
Mass industrialization consumed the majority of economic resources, the 
population being obliged to pay the price of pharaonic planning. A lack of 
food products, rationing, shortages and pressure from the repressive state 
apparatus became a constant of everyday life in Ceaușescu’s Romania. 
 Having reached the peak of his power, Ceaușescu found himself 
confronted by his first critics. Respect for human rights became problematic, 
despite Romania being one of the signatories of the final Act of Helsinki. 
Ceaușescu proved to be ruthless when the foundations of his personal 
dictatorship were attacked. This was illustrated in the cases of the writer 
6  London, The National Archives (hereafter, TNA), FCO 28, 3444, R. A. Burns, British 
Embassy Bucharest, to D. G. Lambert, FCO, 8 February 1978.
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Paul Goma, the historian Vlad Georgescu and the worker Vasile Paraschiv, 
all of whom were victims of psychiatric repression. Dissidents were arrested 
and investigated, freed only as a result of international pressure and then 
obliged to leave Romania. The series of challenges to the regime continued 
with the miners’ strike in the Jiu Valley, a rebellion against working 
conditions and the economic situation, which only calmed down after 
Ceaușescu visited the Jiu Valley on 2 August 1977 and promised the miners 
that some of their demands would be met (a reduction of the pension age, 
a salary increase, reduction of the working day and free meals).
Romania and Great Britain: A case of mutual attraction
In spite of the obvious deterioration of the internal situation in Romania 
and increasing ideological dogmatism, Ceaușescu continued to enjoy 
international prestige until the end of the 1970s. Relations with the Western 
states followed a rising curve, Ceaușescu showing a particular interest in 
normalizing relations with Great Britain, which had supported Romania’s 
joining GATT and the IMF. Signals had been made by the Bucharest 
leadership right after Ceaușescu came to power, while the visit to London 
by a delegation led by Alexandru Bârlădeanu in February 1966 seemed to 
indicate a similar interest from the British side. The technological needs 
of a Romania which wanted to become an industrialized power could 
not go unnoticed by one of the most advanced economies in the world. 
During the discussions, the British assured the Romanian delegation that 
British industry disposed of sufficient resources to deliver to Romania the 
goods and equipment it needed.7 There remained, however, the unresolved 
problem of the debts and arrears Romania owed Great Britain. Despite the 
assurances given by Alexandru Bârlădeanu that the Romanian government 
sought solutions to the debt payments, in 1978, more than ten years later, 
Foreign Office reports showed that they had not yet been paid.8 
 British interest in Romania must be seen in the wider context of the 
redefinition of UK foreign policy regarding the countries of Central and 
South-eastern Europe. The positions lost in the Mediterranean and the 
Balkans at the end of the Second World War had to be recovered through 
the promotion of a more active policy towards the Communist bloc. 
The British had understood that the Communist regimes had become 
more interested in the development of their own economies and in the 
7  Ambasadorii Majestății Sale în România. Relațiile dintre Regatul Unit și România, 
1964–1970, pp. 104–14.
8  TNA, PREM 16, 638, Record of a meeting between the Prime Minister and emissaries 
from president Ceaușescu in the House of Commons on 23 April 1975.
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rejection of economic and political dependency on the Soviet Union. Such 
tendencies served the long-term interests of the British, and was an idea 
supported by Julian Amery, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, who 
made an official visit to Bucharest on 23 June 1973. In the course of an 
interview with Ceaușescu he discussed collaboration on an international 
level (supporting common projects in the framework of preparation for 
the European conference) and bilaterally. The Bucharest leader accused the 
British of being reserved on the question of developing economic relations 
with Romania. In comparison with the FRG, statistical data indicated 
a reduced presence of Great Britain in the trade activities of Romania. 
In Ceaușescu’s opinion, economic collaboration played a primary role 
in the promotion of a new policy in the solution of political problems.9 
Amery assured him that British foreign policy aimed to improve economic 
relations with the socialist countries of Eastern Europe10 — Great Britain’s 
joining the European Economic Community, in January 1973, showed that 
British policy was adapting to the new political and economic realities. 
However, it was not an argument that convinced Ceaușescu, who saw in 
the EEC an obstacle to the development of economic relations between 
European states of different systems of organization. In his opinion, the 
division of the continent was accentuated with the appearance of this 
organism, while penetration of Western markets would only happen on 
the basis of individual agreements, which excluded belonging to the blocs. 
The interview ended with Julian Amery’s invitation to Ceaușescu to visit 
Great Britain: ‘It will be a great honour and a great pleasure for us to see 
you in London.’11 Thus began a major diplomatic campaign which led 
to the organization of the State Visit of June 1978. Beginning with this 
invitation, a Foreign Office report emphasized that ‘politically our interest 
in Romania is to support and encourage her independent stance. This 
requires visits, and we shall not be able to take back from Ceaușescu the 
bone that Mr Amery offered him’.12
 Great Britain’s attraction to Romania can also be placed in the 
context of its own internal affairs. From the early seventies onwards, the 
country was in deepening economic and social difficulties, the first major 
manifestation of which was the sterling crisis of 1972. If Ceaușescu was 
challenged by the miners of the Jiu Valley, the Conservative government 
9  Arhivele Naționale Istorice Centrale (hereafter, ANIC), Fond CC al PCR, Secția 
Relații Externe, dosar 109/1973, f. 8.
10  Ibid., f. 12.
11  Ibid., f. 18.
12  TNA, FCO 28, 2549, J. L. Bullard to Sir J. Killick, 18 October 1974.
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had already been humiliated by the miners of the Rhondda Valley. Against 
a backdrop of industrial unrest, sectarian violence in Northern Ireland, 
a rising Far Right and cultural revolt — symbolized by the Sex Pistols’ 
anarchic ‘God Save the Queen’ released during the Jubilee Year of 1977 
— the fragile Labour government was eventually forced to ask for a bail-
out from the IMF. In such a troubled context, economic opportunities in 
Romania, however modest, could not be sniffed at.
 The number of British officials and delegations visiting Romania 
increased significantly. Among those who met Ceaușescu were John 
Gollan, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Great Britain 
(CPGB), Margaret Thatcher, Secretary of State for Science and Education, 
Lord Drumalbyn, Minister without Portfolio, Harold Wilson, leader of 
the Labour Party, General Michael Carver, head of the high command of 
British land troops, Peter Walker, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, 
John Payton, Minister for Transport, as well as delegations from the British 
Parliament, the Labour Party and the Confederation of British Industry.13 
In June 1972 a long term economic cooperation agreement was signed 
which settled the frameworks for collaboration in industry and agriculture. 
In accordance with this agreement, Romania would manufacture Islander 
BN-2 planes and gas turbine plane engines in cooperation with Rolls-
Royce; installations would be acquired for the construction of irrigation 
systems; glasshouses for vegetables and flowers would be built, and 
a British-Romanian bank would be founded with its headquarters in 
London. There were negotiations for the manufacture of Ford vans, 
electric furnaces for heating, and on-board protection for the crews of 
planes and helicopters.14 In December 1972, a Rolls-Royce delegation was 
received by Ceaușescu, who did not hide his interest in British technology, 
declaring that he wanted to have manufactured in Romania ‘a son of the 
Rolls-Royce’.15 Ceaușescu’s intentions were not limited to the construction 
of civil aircraft, but aimed at a wider range of engines and technologies 
necessary for the aviation industry, including the military. Development 
of the Romanian aeronautics industry was one of Ceaușescu’s ambitions, 
and he tested both the British and French markets with a view to acquiring 
technologies and licenses. The conditions offered by the British were more 
advantageous, which explains his choice of the British company.16
13  ANIC, Fond CC al PCR, Secția Relații Externe, dosar 109/1973, ff. 20–21.
14  Ibid., f. 22.
15  Ibid., 149/1972, f. 3.
16  See Petre Opriș, Licențe străine pentru produse civile și militare fabricate în România 
(1946–1989), Bucharest, 2018, p. 168.
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 The Communist regime in Bucharest had not wished for the defeat of the 
Heath government at the elections in 1974. It did not want an official visit 
against the background of a miners’ strike in which the significant role of 
the CPGB was a major media story. Ambassador D. R. A. Ashe reported: ‘In 
their opinion, a victory for Mr Wilson would be disastrous; they considered 
him utterly untrustworthy, a friend of the hard-line organizations of 
international Communism and an opponent of the Anglo-Romanian 
relationship which they hoped to achieve.’17 Nevertheless, despite Labour’s 
narrow victory, diplomatic efforts intensified. A new high-point of British-
Romanian relations was reached in September 1975, when Ceaușescu 
received in Bucharest two of the most important figures in British politics: 
Margaret Thatcher, leader of the Conservative Party (2 September), and 
Harold Wilson, British Prime Minister (16 September). This was not 
Margaret Thatcher’s first official visit to Romania. In September 1971 she had 
spent two days in Romania as Secretary of State for Education and Science, 
but had not received special attention from the party leadership. The second 
visit to Romania came shortly after the end of the Helsinki Conference, 
and the meeting with Ceaușescu offered a good opportunity to understand 
where the Bucharest leader stood on the conference decisions. Ceaușescu did 
not hide his unhappiness with the general character of the understandings 
signed by the participating states in Helsinki in August 1975. Security and 
disarmament took priority, in his view, over humanitarian cases. In reply, 
the Conservative leader insisted on the freedom of movement that the 
countries had to ensure all citizens.18 The continuation of the arms race, 
the existence of military blocs and domination by the great powers were, 
in Ceaușescu’s opinion, the main threats to general security. Thatcher was 
interested in the rhythms of development of the Romanian economy, and 
especially the rate of investment in the internal situation after the floods 
of June 1975. The Conservative leader seemed impressed by the economic 
progress achieved by Romania: 
The secret of your success resides in the fact that you have managed 
to convince the people to postpone until tomorrow expectations of a 
more substantial improvement in their living conditions. We too have 
difficulties concerning this, because the majority of people want to have 
an improvement of living conditions today, and do not understand that by 
consuming more today they will have less tomorrow.19
17  TNA, FCO 28, 2549, D. R. Ashe to J. L. Bullard, 21 January 1974.
18  ANIC, Fond CC al PCR, Secția Relații Externe, dosar 153/1975, f. 3f/v.
19  Ibid., f. 8f/v.
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 This renunciation of comfort was not, however, the result of a voluntary 
act, as Ceaușescu tried to present it; on the contrary, the population 
was feeling acutely the negative effects of his economic policy. Romania 
was confronting an accelerated deterioration of the trade balance and 
a growing budget deficit, caused by realities that Ceaușescu was unable 
to understand: on the one hand, the rules of the Common Market, 
which limited the circulation of Romanian products and, on the other, 
the technological gap and problems with the quality of Romanian 
finished products. Ceaușescu responded by massively reducing imports of 
consumer goods and rationing consumption. As for Margaret Thatcher, 
she would have to wait until 1979 to apply her monetarist medicine to the 
economy and society of Great Britain.
 The development of trade with Great Britain remained a priority for 
the Bucharest regime, which desired a considerable increase in commercial 
exchanges and the elimination of existing restrictions on the British 
market.20 The Bucharest government sought a special increase of £1 
million in the amount of Romanian textiles exported, the importation of 
five BAC planes, the granting of government credit at a preferential rate, 
the increase of lines of finance for the importation of installations, tools 
and machines, the regulation of imports of coke and cokeable carbons 
and active collaboration with British firms on third markets.21 The visit 
by prime minister Harold Wilson to Bucharest, the first of its kind since 
the Second World War, gave Ceaușescu another opportunity to discuss 
widening the framework of economic collaboration.22 It was not the 
leaders’ first meeting. Wilson had visited Romania in June 1972 as leader 
of the Labour Party, and had a short interview with Ceaușescu on 12 June 
1975, when the latter stopped off in London after a trip to Mexico and 
Brazil. 
 Harold Wilson was familiar with Romanian diplomatic efforts to 
improve relations with Great Britain, having received all the offical 
delegations which had arrived in London since 1966. In Bucharest, the 
British prime minister was interested to find out Ceaușescu’s opinion 
concerning the political changes taking place in the Soviet Union, the 
evolution of Sino-Soviet relations, Europe after Helsinki, and the situation 
in Spain and Portugal. Political discussions were complemented by talks 
about economic collaboration. Ceaușescu returned to Romania’s desire to 
develop the aviation industry, which would extend the partnership with 
20  Ibid., f. 15.
21  Ibid., f. 15 f/v.
22  ANIC, Fond CC al PCR, Secția Relații Externe, dosar 164/1975, f. 3–4/f/v.
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Rolls-Royce.23 For an economic collaboration ‘advantageous to both sides’, 
he proposed the creation of joint companies and common actions on 
third markets. Ceaușescu did not hide his discontent with Britain’s refusal 
to grant Romania credit at a preferential rate: ‘I would like to mention 
that Romania had a right to receive from England a certain support, 
as a developing country, given the fact that England made profits from 
Romania over quite a long period, especially in the domain of oil.’24 
 Once the agenda for economic collaboration had been settled, Harold 
Wilson sought to clarify the conditions on which the State Visit could be 
organized. Following consultation with the Queen, it was decided that the 
State Visit would take place in 1978, ‘including a parade through London 
in a gold carriage with white horses’. Wilson reported back to Ceaușescu 
that ‘[s]uch a visit will not be announced a long time before, but at a given 
date. This means that everyone will wear short trousers, with the exception 
of you and Prince Philip’.25
The bone and burden of a State Visit
Harold Wilson’s outline for the State Visit came after Romanian officials’ 
insistence that the event be organized as soon as possible after the invitation 
was first given, in June 1973. The ‘bone’ offered by Julian Amery was as 
much a burden for the Romanian diplomats as it was for their British 
counterparts. There was the option of a simple working visit, suggested by 
the Foreign Office, but which would not have benefited from the attention 
attracted by a State Visit. Ceaușescu made it known that he wanted to be 
received with full honours.26 J. L. Bullard, for the Eastern European and 
Soviet Department, expressed reservations as to the opportuneness of a 
State Visit: 
I can believe that a State Visit by Ceaușescu would not be particularly 
welcome to either the Palace or to the British public. Nevertheless, I fear 
we are committed to it. Further delay in offering a date could cause the 
Romanians to question whether our present Ministers are as interested in 
Romania as their predecessors. In other words, the matter could become 
a grievance.27  
23  Ibid., f. 12v, f. 16v.
24  Ibid., f. 16f.
25  Ibid., f. 26/v.
26  TNA, FCO 28, 2549, J. L. Bullard to Sir J. Killick. State visit and outgoing royal visits 
1974 and beyond, 18 October 1974.
27  Ibid.
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 Nicolae Ceaușescu aspired to have his status as an international leader 
reconfirmed, especially in the context of the deterioration of Romania’s 
internal situation. The missions of Ștefan Andrei, secretary of the PCR’s 
Central Committee, to London in spring 1974–75 aimed to persuade Great 
Britain to support a common agenda concerning the CSCE, but by far the 
most important aim was to ensure the organization of a State Visit. If this 
visit could be planned to coincide with the finalization of the Helsinki 
conference, Ceaușescu’s international prestige would be fully recognized. 
However this was precisely what British officials feared: ‘I suspect that the 
message may in fact be connected with CSCE and possibly with President 
Ceaușescu’s persistent wish to be invited to Britain on a State Visit. The 
Embassy in Bucharest have been asked if they can discover anything more 
about the purpose of the proposed visit.’28 But the British offical calender 
did not allow for the organization of such an event in 1974–75. Ștefan 
Andrei had already been informed of this situation in May 1974: 
Mr Andrei said that President Ceaușescu would also like to visit the Prime 
Minister in London, but for this purpose would need an official invitation 
from the Queen: all the President’s official visits to constitutional 
monarchies had followed a similar invitation from the Head of State. The 
Prime Minister said that President Ceaușescu would be a most welcome 
visitor in this country. A state visit was slightly more difficult to arrange 
than a more informal visit, since the former category was planned several 
years ahead, and decisions had already been taken for the next few years.29 
A similar response was received by Vasile Pungan, Romania’s former 
ambassador to London (1966–72), during an interview with the Lord Privy 
Seal in Bucharest in August 1974.30 For the visit to take place in 1975 and be 
included on the offical agenda, Vasile Pungan suggested a reduction in the 
duration and a simplification of the ceremonial element. The Lord Privy 
Seal invoked the very strict protocol of the Court, which did not allow 
the organization of more than three visits per year. Moreover, giving up 
the ceremonial element would not resolve the problem. A. F. Green, of the 
28  TNA, PREM 16, 638, Emissaries from President Ceausescu, 19 March 1975. See also, 
Stăpânul secretelor lui Ceaușescu. I se spunea Machiavelli. Ștefan Andrei în dialog cu 
Lavinia Betea, Bucharest, 2011, p. 198.
29  TNA, PREM 16, 638, Record of a meeting between the Prime Minister and Mr Ștefan 
Andrei (secretary of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party) at no 10 
Downing Street, at 3.00 p.m. on Friday 3 May 1974.
30  TNA, FCO 28, 2549, Note of a meeting between the Lord Privy Seal and Mr Pungan 
in Bucharest, 21 August 1974.
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Eastern European and Soviet Department, informed the British Embassy 
in Bucharest on 15 July 1974 that there was no possibility of organizing 
a visit in 1975 or 1976, while 1977 was totally taken up by ceremonies for 
the Silver Jubilee. Therefore, Ceaușescu’s visit could, in all probability, be 
organized in 1978, if other events did not intervene.31 
 The official invitation finally arrived on 14 September 1977, transmitted 
by the British ambassador, Reginald Secondé, to the Romanian Foreign 
Minister, George Macovescu.32 In London, the official announcement 
was made on 25 October 1977.33 Unlike in 1973, when the invitation was 
first mooted, the external context had changed considerably. East-West 
relations had entered a new phase, while the Helsinki conference had 
introduced, as an obligatory norm,  respect for human rights, which made 
the Bucharest regime vulnerable. 
 The Foreign Office analysed closely the impact of Ceaușescu’s visit, 
which was considered to be of ‘special significance’. Through it the British 
government wanted to encourage Romania to follow the same line of 
independent foreign policy, create new bases for growth in exports to 
Romania, maintain at a high level the bilateral relationship in the spirit 
of the joint declaration signed by Harold Wilson with Ceaușescu in 1975, 
promote British positions concerning East-West relations and the future of 
the CSCE process and obtain a positive attitude to issues of free movement 
of people. On the other hand, Romanian interests were as much political 
as economic. Ceaușescu continued to emphasize the importance of the 
development of relations with Western states, in order to give more weight 
to his independent policies in the Communist bloc. Relations with Great 
Britain served Romanian interests well, thanks to the British government’s 
positions in the Common Market, NATO, the UN Security Council 
and in the general global processes of disarmament and detente. It was 
expected that Romania would insist on growth in Romanian exports to the 
British market and the relaxing of existing restrictions, and that it would 
request advantageous credit for the purchase of British equipment and 
technology:34 
31  TNA, FCO 28, 2549, A. F. Green, Eastern European and Soviet Department, to D. R. 
Ashe, Bucharest, 15 July 1974.
32  Arhivele Ministerului Afacerilor Externe (hereafter, AMAE), Problema 220A/1978, 
vol. I, f. 43–46.
33  TNA, FCO 28, 3080, K. B. A. Scott, Eastern European and Soviet Department to Mr 
Whyte, News Department, 21 October 1977.
34  TNA, PREM 16, 1838, State visit of President Ceausescu to the United Kingdom 
13-16 June 1978: talks with the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs. Brief no 1, 6 June 1978.
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In part, the invitation is intended to recognise the special position of 
Romania as a Communist country with an independent foreign policy 
and one which, by maintaining good relations with countries of all 
political persuasions, has a unique contribution to make to the solution 
of international problems (the Middle East is an example). It is also hoped 
that the visit will encourage closer commercial relations between our two 
countries and thereby increase the opportunities for British exporters in 
Romania.35
 According to Foreign Office summaries, the volume of commercial 
exchanges had by 1977 reached its highest level in the history of bilateral 
relations: £100 million. Romania occupied fifth place in the ranking of 
the most important trading partners Great Britain had in Eastern Europe. 
British exports to Romania amounted to £80.6 million, with Romanian 
imports at £52.5 million. The figures were optimistic and met the level 
of growth that Harold Wilson and Ceaușescu had agreed upon in 1975 
(from £68 million in 1974 to £170 million in 1980).36 Even if the balance 
was favourable to Britain, British officials were not confident that it would 
continue to evolve, as there were many variables which influenced the 
balance of trade — prices, the evolution of markets and technological 
development. Officials noted that ‘the Romanians are anxious not only to 
expand their exports but also to develop their technological and managerial 
infrastructure. They propose to achieve this through association with 
advanced companies in projects which Romanians would not themselves 
be able to perform’.37 Romania exported chemical and metallurgical 
products, wood, furniture and construction materials, light industry and 
food products. It imported technology needed for the manufacture of cars, 
planes, electrical and electro-technical products, chemical products and 
raw materials for the food and pharmaceutical industries. Romania was 
also interested in obtaining an advantageous price for the manufacture 
of BAC 1-11 Series 475 planes with British Aerospace; producing plane 
engines in collaboration with Rolls-Royce; collaborating with Dowty for 
the manufacture of hydraulic components for aviation; manufacturing 
precision-engineered parts for the aviation industry with High Duty Alloys 
Ltd; manufacturing cars benefiting from British technology, and creating 
a joint company based in Romania to produce and sell Shell lubricating 
35  TNA, FCO 28, 3436, David Owen to Sir Derek Walker-Smith QC MP, 12 May 1978.
36  TNA, PREM 16, 1838, State Visit of the President of the Socialist Republic of Romania 
and Madame Ceausescu, 13–16 June 1978. Background note (undated). 
37  Ibid.
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oils. The development of commercial exchanges between 1971 and 1978 
indicated a rising trend (see table below).38
    1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 March–June 1978
British   31.2 38.9 34.2 35.5 39.8 48.9 80.6   18.1
exports to
Romania
Romanian  21.2 25.4 31.8 34.3 36.1 49.4 52.5   11.1
exports to 
Britain
Volume  52.4 64.3 66.0 67.8 75.9 98.3 133.1   29.2 
of trade
Trade    +10.0 +13.5 +2.5 +1.2 +3.7 -0.5 +28.1   +7.0
balance
 In terms of foreign policy, the first half of 1978 was a successful one 
for Ceaușescu. To Bucharest came the German Chancellor Helmut 
Schmidt (January) and Egypt’s Mohammed Anwar el-Sadat (February). 
At the same time, the diplomatic apparatus worked on preparing two 
extremely important State visits on the Romanian president’s agenda: 
to the USA in April and Great Britain in June. Internally, however, the 
economic situation had not recovered, while Ceaușescu’s solutions — 
increased social control and a reduction in domestic consumption — only 
served to increase discontent amongst the population. The drawing up 
of new directives in March 1978 for the planning and administration of 
the economy did not have the desired effects, aggravating the chaos in 
industry and agriculture. A direct consequence of the deterioration of 
the economic situation was the negative balance in external trade, with 
Romania registering the lowest level in its entire post-war history.39 That 
said, the birthday of ‘the most beloved son of the people’ was marked by 
Ceaușescu being awarded honorary doctorates in politics and economics 
for his ‘inestimable contributions to the development of the concepts of 
economic and political science’ by the Academia ‘Ștefan Gheorghiu’ and 
by the Academy for Economic Studies. 
38  Ibid.
39  Adam Burakowski, Dictatura lui Nicolae Ceaușescu. 1965–1989. Geniul Carpaților, 
Iași, 2011, pp. 242–43.
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 Western governments had by now become much more preoccupied 
with Romania’s internal situation. The hardening of the dictatorship, 
the excesses of the cult of the personality and human rights abuses were 
constant themes in reports from foreign diplomats in Bucharest, and the 
British were no exception. The British Ambassador, Reginald Secondé, 
reported to the Foreign Office on 24 April 1978 that few people who 
dared speak about Ceaușescu — fear of punishment made them very 
cautious. Fear had become a state of mind in Communist Romania. 
The long speeches, crammed with clichés from Marxist philosophy, the 
extended ovations and adulation of the Conducător perplexed the British 
ambassador: 
It is not just boredom at these marathon speeches, or the bobbing up and 
down. One can even accept the huge picture of the President smiling 
equably from behind the podium. The uncomfortable sight is that of 
Ministers, Generals and high officials, whom one knows to be intelligent 
and cultured men, clapping and chanting ‘Cea-u-șes-cu-P-C-R’ to the 
rhythm of ‘Sing a Song of Sixpence, A Pocket full of Rye’. The sinister 
aspect is that a shrewd and experienced statesman like Ceaușescu can 
accept such orchestrated adulation.40
Behind the collective hysteria, which was difficult for a foreign observer 
to understand, lay the discipline and total mobilization that Ceaușescu 
had successfully engendered around him. In May 1978, a Foreign Office 
analysis by K. B. A. Scott for the British ambassador described the situation 
in Romania in precise terms:
Ceaușescu is a despot but the Romanians find nothing unusual in 
having such a figure at the helm. His internal policies are unsavoury and 
repressive, and have provoked considerable criticism abroad, but he has 
brought about a remarkable degree of economic advancement at home 
and has shown great skill and wisdom in international relations. His great 
merit in Romanian eyes is his nationalism and the extent to which he has 
been able to assert Romanian independence from the Russians; this too is 
of considerable merit to the West.41 
 For the Foreign Office, preparing the first State Visit of the Bucharest 
leader to London was not an easy mission. The British press showed little 
40  TNA, FCO 28, 3407, Reginald Secondé to David Owen MP, 24 April 1978.
41  TNA, FCO 28, 3407, K. B. A. Scott to Reginald Secondé, 11 May 1978.
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sign of goodwill towards him. Foreign Office experts expected that the 
issue of human rights would be used as the main argument in negative 
press campaigns. On the announcement of the visit, in October 1977, the 
Daily Telegraph and Sunday Telegraph criticized the authorities’ decision 
to invite Ceaușescu to the United Kingdom.42 It was rumoured that other 
negative articles were going to appear in the British press. In the Foreign 
Office, there were many reservations about a positive press coverage of the 
visit. The British ambassador in Bucharest signalled that the Romanian 
side already got off to a bad start with the British press by forbidding entry, 
in April 1978, to The Times correspondent, Dessa Trevisan.43 A report 
from the Romanian embassy in London emphasized the efforts made 
to promote positive news about Ceaușescu’s policies in the British mass 
media. The Bucharest authorities tried to win the goodwill of the British 
press and invited more than thirty journalists and radio and television 
commentators to Romania. As a result, a series of positive articles had 
appeared in respected national broadsheets including the Guardian, Daily 
Telegraph, Sunday Telegraph, Financial Times and Observer.44
 Another source of disquiet came from representatives of Hungarian 
émigrés in London, as well as ‘Romanian reactionary immigrants’, who 
announced that they would organize protests while Ceaușescu was in 
London. The Hungarian émigrés protested the lack of rights and freedoms 
enjoyed by the Magyar minority in Romania and distributed hostile 
propaganda material. In their support, Lord Balogh, former adviser to 
Harold Wilson, planned to bring up in official discussions the issue of the 
Hungarian minority, who also received support from Hungarian émigrés 
in the USA, Italy and Switzerland. On the other hand, Romanian émigrés 
in the Western states announced that they would protest against human 
rights abuses and the lack of religious freedom in Communist Romania. 
Among the main activists were Ion Rațiu in London, Alexandru Guga in 
the FRG, the Greco-Catholic bishop Vasile Cristea and the Greco-Catholic 
priests Ion Tăutu, Pamfil Cârnațiu and Ilie Mercaș.45 The Bucharest 
authorities had requested that the Foreign Office prevent the organization 
of demonstrations, so that Ceaușescu would not be disturbed by hostile 
actions.46 
42  TNA, FCO 28, 3080, Mr Whyte to K. B. A. Scott, 21 October 1977.
43  TNA, FCO 28, 3407, K. B. A. Scott to Reginald Secondé, 11 May 1978.
44  AMAE: Problema 20/1978, f. 57.
45  TNA, FCO 28, 3427, Ceausescu State Visit: Security, 6 June 1978.
46  Ibid.
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 Respect for human rights was to be one of the most sensitive subjects 
of the State Visit. Reports by Amnesty International gave the Foreign 
Office information about the Romanian authorities’ use of psychiatric 
treatment against those who exercised their right to freedom of expression 
and conscience. According to Amnesty, over thirty people had suffered 
psychiatric abuse, the most well-known being Ion Vulcănescu, who had 
left Romania in 1977 after being arrested, investigated and interned in 
a psychiatric hospital.47 Another sensitive issue was that of people who 
wished to marry British citizens or leave Romania to be reunited with 
relatives in exile. The British authorities had received assurances from the 
Romanians that all requests would receive a positive response. 
 The technical details of the visit, especially concerning the strict protocol 
for the treatment of guests, was another reason for disquiet amongst 
British officials. In diplomatic circles there were numerous rumours 
about the attitude and behaviour of the Ceaușescus in various capitals of 
the world. The gravest incidents had apparently taken place during the 
Romanian leader’s tour of Latin America. According to reports, Ceaușescu 
had hysterical fits, insisted on last-minute changes to the programme, and 
drank excessively at official dinners, while his bodyguards were violent 
towards the hosts.48 There was also concern about the personality of the 
Romanian first lady, who, it was reported, had been irritable and sulky at 
official dinners. However, in October 1974, Richard Fletcher tried to give 
assurances to the Foreign Office: 
Since the Latin American trip of 1973 she has been prominent in nearly all 
the major State occasions and it is noticeable that efforts have been made 
to improve her outward appearance — a new hair style and allegedly crates 
of long evening dresses flown in from Paris. Whether this transformation 
from ugly duckling to swan has been successful is hard to say, but in 
political terms there is little more she has to aspire to. […] Relying on 
diplomatic gossip and appearances on television and in the press, I judged 
Elena to be a very hard, severe woman of immense ambition. But only 
two days ago I had my first opportunity, at the opening of the Bucharest 
International Fair, to see Elena close to and I confess that she did not match 
up to her reputation. She was very plainly and inexpensively dressed; she 
wore no make-up at all. She has a quiet, pleasant voice and looks like 
47  TNA, FCO 28, 3436, Amnesty International on human rights violations in Romania, 
12 June 1978.
48  TNA, FCO 28, 2549, D. R. Ashe to J. Killick, 2 August 1974. See also, FCO 28, 3407, 
Reginald Secondé to David Owen MP, 24 April 1978.
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someone you would expect to see selling poppies on Remembrance Day 
around St George’s Square.49
 Another related problem which the British authorities were confronted 
with was how to give due recognition to Elena Ceaușescu’s achievements 
in science. In December 1977, the British Embassy in Athens reported that 
Greek President Tsatsos had ‘told the Ambassador with a smile that he had 
“acted unconstitutionally” by signing a decree appointing Mme Ceaușescu 
a Corresponding Member of the Athens Academicians, who noted that 
her only published works are on chemistry written by herself and other 
workers’.50 The signals received from Bucharest in the months preceding 
the visit to Great Britain indicated that there was a similar express desire 
that she receive a title or even more from a prestigious British university. 
A first test of British intentions came on 3 April 1978 from the Romanian 
ambassador to London, Pretor Popa, during discussions with British 
officials about the visit’s programme. In Bucharest, it had been decided 
that Elena Ceaușescu would visit the Royal Society, which strongly implied 
that she wanted to receive an honorary distinction. Ambassador Popa 
‘wondered whether it would be possible for Madame Ceaușescu to receive 
some academic award in addition to any ceremonial award. […] It was 
explained that British academic institutions were inclined to be rather 
touchy about their independence and it was not in the gift of Government 
to arrange an academic award. It was felt that the FCO should explore the 
possibilities. It was, however, made fairly clear to the Romanians that we 
were unlikely to be successful’.51 Visibly irritated, a few days later K. B. 
A. Scott wrote to the British ambassador in Bucharest that the Romanian 
side had to understand that the British government could not pressurize 
universities into giving academic distinctions. Their independence was 
fully respected in Great Britain.52 Subsequently, the issue was resolved by 
making Elena Ceaușescu an honorary member of the Royal Institute for 
Chemistry. The Polytechnic of Central London also conferred upon her 
the title of ‘Professor Honoris Causa’ (both the School of Slavonic and East 
European Studies and the University of Bradford refused to give her an 
award).
49  TNA, FCO 28, 2549, Richard Fletcher to Foreign Office, 15 October 1974.
50  TNA, FCO 28, 3080, Brooks Richards to R. W. H. du Boulay, 6 December 1977.
51  TNA, FCO 28, 3424, D. G. Lambert to Mr Battiscombe and Mr Scott, 6 April 1978.
52  Ibid.
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The State Visit
On 13 June 1978 Nicolae Ceaușescu became the first Communist leader 
to make a State Visit to the United Kingdom. As Harold Wilson had 
promised, the Ceaușescus were met with full honours. From the airport, 
the guests boarded a train for Victoria Station, where they were greeted 
by Queen Elizabeth II, Prince Philip, Prime Minister James Callaghan, 
Foreign Minister David Owen and other top officials. After reviewing 
the guard of honour, hosts and guests were led to the royal carriages. 
The Queen and Ceaușescu led the cortege across central London towards 
Buckingham Palace.53 The Visit’s calendar included banquets, receptions, 
official meetings and visits to industrial facilities. 
 Back in Romania, the millennia-old friendship with Britain was 
emphasized in the cultural media. In the preceding months, Magazin 
istoric ran several articles on this theme: Anglo-Saxon exiles to the Black 
Sea after the Battle of Hastings; ‘Daco-British confluences’ after the 
Roman Empire; Dumitru Brătianu’s diplomatic mission to Great Britain in 
1848–58; English merchants in sixteenth-century Moldavia; Britain’s heroic 
six-year war against Hitlerism and, of course, the history of Buckingham 
Palace.54 România literară published a eulogistic article about the Brontë 
sisters and reminded readers of the honorary degree conferred upon 
Nicolae Iorga by the University of Oxford in 1930, while a British cinema 
week was organized to coincide with the visit, showcasing films such as 
Bugsy Malone and A Bridge Too Far.
 The first evening opened with a state banquet held at Buckingham 
Palace. The Queen’s toast referred to common Roman origins which 
linked the British and Romanians and declared her admiration for the 
independent policy pursued by Ceaușescu, ‘a statesman of world renown’. 
The Queen declared herself delighted with the development of trade with 
Romania and its openness to Great Britain: ‘Let us hope that many more 
Romanians will come to Great Britain. They will be very welcome.’55 
 The second day of the State Visit opened with a meeting between 
Nicolae Ceaușescu and Edmund Dell, minister for trade, also attended 
by representatives of British companies planning to extend business in 
Romania. At the same time, Elena Ceaușescu was received by the Royal 
Institute of Chemistry, where she received the title of ‘fellow’, then the 
title of professor honoris causa from the Polytechnic of Central London. 
53  ANIC, Fond CC al PCR, Secția Relații Externe, dosar 82/1978, f. 3–4.
54  See Magazin istoric, February–June 1978.
55  ANIC, Fond CC al PCR, Secția Relații Externe, dosar 82/1978, f. 13.
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Ceaușescu’s programme continued with a meeting with James Callaghan 
at 10 Downing Street. The programme included three interviews with the 
British prime minister, two in tête-à-tête and one as a plenary.56 The main 
themes touched upon were the evolution of East-West relations after the 
CSCE conference in Belgrade; Romania’s relations with the USSR, USA 
and Western European states; the Middle East; tendencies in the world 
economy; disarmament and the control of nuclear weapons; problems 
in Africa; cooperation between the Balkan states, and the situation in 
the Far East (China, Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia). Discussion of bilateral 
issues covered commercial and cultural relations and collaboration in 
agriculture, transport and oil technology.
 Ceaușescu openly displayed an interest in strengthening links with 
Britain, particularly through the aerospace industry, proposing that 
commercial exchanges reach £600 million in 1980 and grow to £1 billion 
by 1985.57 He wanted the British market to be more open to Romanian 
products and imports to be liberalized. Another theme was the evolution 
of North-South relations and the potential for development implied by 
the New Economic Order. Disarmament was also on the agenda for 
discussions with the British prime minister, as one of the favourite themes 
of Ceaușescu’s foreign policy programme. The inconclusive results of 
recent discussions in Vienna on the reduction of nuclear arsenals, tensions 
between the superpowers and especially NATO’s decision to increase 
its arms budget, followed by a similar measure by the Warsaw Pact, 
encouraged, in Ceaușescu’s opinion, the arms race and created a climate of 
instability. The British prime minister was interested to hear Ceaușescu’s 
opinion on Soviet-American relations, which were at a ‘moment of 
tension’. According to Ceaușescu, these new tensions affected the entire 
international climate and it was necessary for all states to participate in the 
quest for acceptable solutions. The discussion also covered issues in Africa, 
the Middle East, human rights and the need to respect the decisions of 
the Helsinki Conference. Special attention was given to relations between 
China and the Soviet Union, with Ceaușescu expressing confidence that, in 
spite of some difficult moments, there existed conditions for normalization. 
The prime minister’s concerns were linked to China’s wish to acquire 
warplanes from Great Britain, which could provoke a negative reaction 
from Moscow: ‘President Ceausescu told the Prime Minister that he was 
56  TNA, FCO 28, 3439, The Prime Minister’s Discussion with President Ceausescu of 
Romania on 14 and 15 June, 1978.
57  Ibid.
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aware that the Chinese would like to purchase Harrier, and personally 
saw no harm in such a deal going ahead: if the UK did not sell Harriers 
to China, the Chinese will be sure to buy a similar aircraft elsewere.’58 At 
the same time, Ceaușescu made it clear that Romania was not interested in 
acquiring warplanes. 
 The situation in Korea and South-East Asia was also on the agenda 
for bilateral discussions. Ceaușescu was confident about the two Koreas’ 
desire for unification and Vietnam’s intention to normalize relations with 
the USA. Concerning relations with the Communist countries in Europe, 
the British prime minister considered that there existed conditions for 
improvement, but went on to say that, in his view, the UK’s relations with 
Romania ‘would be deeper and more substantial than with some of the 
Socialist countries’.59
 The British prime minister identified three factors that were a negative 
influence on detente: Soviet initiatives to increase the cost of armaments; 
the situation in Africa, and respect for human rights. James Callaghan did 
not insist strongly on the latter, knowing full well that it would touch a raw 
nerve. However, Ceaușescu felt obliged to reply, even if only in a general 
way. In his opinion, the situation had not improved since the Helsinki 
conference and he was not convinced by the functionality of human rights 
principles: 
On the question of human rights President Ceauşescu asked whether it 
was sufficient to indulge in statements and writings on these issues. He 
would not claim that everything was proceeding smoothly in Romania, 
or indeed in any other Socialist country; but equally it could not be said 
that everything was perfect and beyond criticism in the countries of the 
West.60 
There was no return to this issue in further discussions.
 The series of official meetings continued on 15 June with morning 
talks at Buckingham Palace with Margaret Thatcher and the Liberal Party 
leader, David Steel. The presidential couple then travelled to Bristol to 
visit industrial facilities and had meetings with representatives of British 
Aerospace and Rolls-Royce. Ceaușescu declared himself delighted that 
an understanding had been reached on the manufacture of the BAC 1-11 
58  Ibid.
59  Ibid.
60  TNA, PREM 16, 1838, Record of the Prime Minister’s Discussion, in plenary session, 
with President Ceausescu of Romania at 10 Downing Street on 14 June 1978 at 15.00.
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plane and Spey engine in Romania. The visit ended with the signing of 
agreements on political, economic and cultural-scientific collaboration. 
On 16 June, the Ceaușescus returned to Romania, their departure being 
‘greeted with relief. Though the public reaction was lukewarm and there 
was some criticism of Romanian internal policies, there was no serious 
hostility. […] Ceaușescu may have gained in international respectability, 
thus masking his harsh regime at home; but we can go along with 
the Romanian formula that nations with different social systems can 
collaborate for peace and their mutual advantage’.61
 The reactions of the British press were closely monitored by the 
Romanian embassy in London. The press report of the first day of the 
visit concentrated on positive news, reproducing extracts favourable 
to Ceaușescu. However, it was remarked that The Times had published 
a ‘slanderous article’ by Bernard Levin, described as a hard-line anti-
Communist, which easily explained his criticisms of the Bucharest regime. 
It was not the only one: ‘some tendentious appreciations, especially 
concerning the internal situation of our country, come through in 
commentaries published by The Times and Daily Telegraph.’62 Press 
coverage of the visit was, generally speaking, mild without being overly 
indulgent. As the Romanian embassy noted, Bernard Levin attacked 
Ceauşescu’s dynastic Communism and religious persecution. That said, 
this was balanced in The Times by the radical clergyman Mervyn 
Stockwood’s article on ‘big improvements’ in Romania: 
The country has no long tradition of unfettered freedom. The present 
Communist Government is not the first to use methods which are 
repugnant to us in Britain but which we ourselves have used in the past. 
[…] One is grateful that the terrible persecution of the Church at the time 
of the Russian occupation is over and that the Christian faith provides an 
inspiration and an influence for millions of the Romanian people. We in 
Britain might well be envious!63
If the right-wing Daily Telegraph regretted the Romanian dictator being 
received with full honours, it bowed to Realgeopolitik: 
Mr Ceaușescu’s trip’s only defence against Russia’s growing impatience 
is the ties he so sedulously and multifariously establishes with countries 
61  TNA, FCO 28, 3429, Reginald Secondé to David Owen MP, 4 July 1978.
62  AMAE, Problema 220A/1978, vol. VI, f. 76.
63  Mervyn Stockwood, ‘The big improvements’, The Times, 12 June 1978, p. 9.
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outside the Soviet bloc. ‘If you eat me you will be blackmailed in the United 
Nations’, he says like a Daniel to the Russian lion. […] It can well be argued 
that Mr Ceaușescu should at least not be the Queen’s guest. Yet the full 
works are essential for his prestige survival act.64
In the centre-left Observer, Mark Frankland pointed to the burden placed 
by massive industrialization on the Romanian population, comparing this 
unfavourably with the situation in Hungary and Poland, but placed the 
policies of ‘a Latin in a sea of Slavs’ in historical perspective: 
His patriotism seems widely shared among educated Romanians. The 
Communist Party, with such feeble Romanian origins, had to identify 
with the nation. The theme of Romanian history has been to move towards 
independence, not the liberal development of luckier nations to the West. 
Ceaușescu has simply taken up that theme again.65 
Finally, the Communist Morning Star gave little coverage to the visit, 
something which could be explained by its pro-Soviet tendencies as 
well as by the low intensity of exchanges between British and Romanian 
Communists: Ceaușescu did not have the briefest of courtesy meetings 
with the CPGB general secretary Gordon McLennan, let alone the 
moribund British-Romanian Friendship Society. But, in good republican 
and dialectical materialist fashion, the Morning Star cut through the 
pageantry to praise the economic results of the visit: ‘Eastern European 
Socialist countries as well as the Western powers will study with great care 
the extensive areas of cooperation agreed, and the positive prospects this 
offers to East-West relations.’66 None of these newspapers mentioned Elena 
Ceaușescu’s scientific honours. Also absent from Romanian embassy press 
reports was coverage by the BBC and tabloids of the Ceaușescus making 
off with various objects found at Buckingham Palace.
 The tone of the British press also attracted the attention of the Foreign 
Office. Despite the measures taken, Ion Rațiu, leader of Romanian émigrés 
in Great Britain, managed to organize a protest in front of the hotel 
where Ceaușescu hosted a reception in honour of the Queen. The police 
intervened and arrested him. However, a British diplomat expressed relief 
that the press’s tone was not too severe: 
64  ‘Ceausescu at the Palace’, Daily Telegraph, 13 June 1978, p. 16.
65  Mark Frankland, ‘A Latin in a sea of Slavs’, Observer, 11 June 1978, p. 9.
66  Martin Gostwick, ‘Romania trade will grow’, Morning Star, 16 June 1978, p. 1.
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There was […] a real risk that the visit itself could have been marred by 
incidents and by the way the media handled it. We were lucky. Perhaps 
the journalists were able to let off steam at the preparatory press briefing 
and then cooled down. Perhaps (hard boiled in theory though they may 
be) they and their editors did not want to embarrass the Queen. Perhaps 
it was something to do with the Ceaușescus themselves. I don’t know. But 
if the State Visit is to be used again as a tool in our relations with similar 
sensitive countries, where perhaps is particulary valuable, my own feeling 
is that something needs to be done to shorten the time-scales between 
invitation and visit. We could be less fortunate in the future (Saudi Arabia? 
Poland? Indonesia? Philippines?).67
A Visit too far?
Back home, Ceaușescu immediately communicated the results of his 
visit at a meeting of the CPEx on 16 June 1978. A great lover of crowds, 
Romania’s leader  expressed delight at his welcome by British officials: ‘I 
think it was a good, attentive welcome. There were also enough people 
on the streets.’68 Other reasons to be cheerful were the concrete results 
of the visit, among the most important of which were agreements signed 
with British Aerospace, BAC and Rolls-Royce. To this were added eleven 
other partnership agreements with British firms. Ceaușescu wanted to 
manufacture his own aircraft fleet with the help of British technology: 
‘The agreements with BAC and Rolls-Royce create the conditions for 
production of the BAC plan in two variants and the Spey engine. […] 
These agreements are good, but for now they are only on paper; we must 
turn them into reality.’69 The costs amounted to £175 million, a sum 
which Ceaușescu  considered acceptable. British experience in engine 
manufacture would also be used for other branches of industry. Through 
the contract signed with British Aerospace, Romania would acquire three 
fully-equipped BAC 1-11 planes, and receive assistance for the manufacture 
of another. The complete programme foresaw a collaboration over fifteen 
years and a total production of eighty-two planes. The value of the contract 
was over £200 million. At the same time, the value of the contract signed 
with Rolls-Royce was estimated at £100 million. 
 Another gain was the signing of export contracts valued at over 190 
million lei, which practically meant the fulfilment of the export plan for 
the entire year. Confident in the capacity of the Romanian economy to 
67  TNA, FCO 28, 3429, E. A. J. Ferguson to Lord Goronwy-Roberts, 17 July 1979. 
68  ANIC, Fond CC al PCR, Secția Cancelarie, dosar 47/1978, 2v.
69  Ibid., f. 2v.
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produce quality goods, Ceaușescu wanted the export figure to reach £600 
million in 1980 and £1 billion in 1985: ‘We need to reach this figure; we need 
to import and export at the same time. The credits are only a provisional 
solution in solving the problem. The problem is that by selling we can cover 
this credit. This was the clear understanding.’70 
 The Visit had, it seemed, been a complete success, with Ceaușescu 
accumulating impressive symbolic capital. Ștefan Andrei emphasized this, 
even claiming that the Queen had particularly enjoyed the President’s 
company: 
The most important thing was that comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu is the first 
Communist leader to be invited by the Queen of England. The English 
themselves said that the Queen had not done such a thing until now. In 
the evening, she stayed a long time at the reception. Callaghan himself 
said that the Queen stayed a long time, which is unusual, that she felt 
good, and wanted to emphasize the importance she gave to Romania and 
its President.71
 
 But Ceaușescu’s optimism about the accelerated growth in commercial 
exchanges was not shared by the British ambassador to Bucharest. In his 
opinion, the visit itself had certainly been a success, with the Ceaușescu 
couple delighted with the welcome and the result of economic negotiations. 
However, the British ambassador had no reason to believe that the value 
of economic exchanges would reach £600 million in 1980, which meant a 
growth of 65 per cent each year. The figure looked ‘totally unrealistic, and 
it is hard to escape the conclusion that the President simply plucked the 
figures from the air. It seems more practicable to concentrate on the target 
figure of the trade turnover of £170 million by 1980 which was agreed by 
President Ceausescu and Sir Harold Wilson in 1975 and reaffirmed in the 
joint statement issued in the President’s talks with the Prime Minister 
during the visit’.72
 Even if London did not insist on the issue of human rights, its very 
mention seems to have irritated Ceaușescu, who related in Bucharest that 
the British had been interested in the rights and liberties of the population. 
Ceaușescu gave assurances that ‘the building of socialism’ met no such 
difficulties: 
70  Ibid., f. 3v-4f/v.
71  Ibid., f. 6.
72  TNA, FCO 28, 3429, C. C. R. Batiscombe to Mr Ferguson, 12 July 1978.
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We discussed many things about the problems of building socialism in 
Romania, and the Prince [Charles] was particularly interested to know if 
people in Romania could have their own property and income, and when I 
told him that they could have their own homes, deposit money in the CEC 
bank, and receive an interest rate of 5%, all was made clear.73 
The pageantry, however, met his ambitions: ‘I rode in the carriage. 
They looked like something out of the theatre. You saw all these long 
ceremonials, with their fancy outfits, their bright colours. Some of them 
were even laughing, especially those industrialists who said: we are 
interested in aircraft engines, not costumes.’74
 Officials in Bucharest considered the visit to the British capital a real 
success, both from the political perspective, given the public recognition 
of the merits of Ceaușescu, and economically, due to the large number of 
agreements signed. The priorities for the Romanians were aviation, car 
manufacture and the chemical industry. Another important achievement 
was the signature of a cooperation agreement in science, education 
and teaching, which led to the reciprocal opening of cultural centres in 
Bucharest and London. Being open to Western cultural values was a simple 
strategy enabling Ceaușescu to distract attention away from the problems 
that Romanian society was beginning to confront: the restriction of civil 
rights and freedoms (as seen in the cases of the dissidents Paul Goma 
and Vlad Georgescu); excessive ideologization and the deterioration of 
living standards. Economically, the regression of the Bucharest regime 
became evident from the beginning of the 1980s. As British experts had 
already observed, Romania was unable to keep up with technological 
modernization, whilst big industry was directly affected by decisions to 
limit the import of technology from the West. Consequently, Romanian 
products disappeared from Western markets, while many of the contracts 
signed in June 1978 became inoperable. To this was added Ceaușescu’s 
decision to pay off the entire foreign debt, which had direct consequences 
for relations with the Western states. A massive growth in exports, 
especially of agricultural products, and a reduction in imports did not lead 
to economic recovery, but accelerated the production of fictional reports 
and the falsification of data at a central level. On top of this economic 
failure, the emergence of Mikhail Gorbachev in Soviet Russia made 
Ceaușescu seem an unacceptable form of ‘maverick’.
73  ANIC, Fond CC al PCR, Secția Cancelarie, dosar 47/1978, f. 7f/v.
74  Ibid., f. 7v.
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 In December 1989, the West’s favourite anti-Soviet gadfly and bearer of 
modest economic opportunity was now portrayed as a bloodthirsty tyrant 
overthrown then executed by his downtrodden people. The Presidential 
couple were stripped of the honours received only eleven years previously, 
while the State Visit was now reviled as a sordid episode in British diplomacy. 
The satirical magazine Private Eye could not leave uncommented such a 
dramatic reversal of opinion. On its front cover, under the headline ‘It’s 
Ciao-sescu!’, Prince Philip asks Elena Ceaușescu: ‘And does he have any 
hobbies?’, to which she replies, ‘He’s a mass murderer’. A beaming Queen 
Elizabeth II comments, ‘How interesting!’75 At the end of the 1980s, 
Ceaușescu had lost all credibility, being as isolated in the Communist bloc 
as in his relations with the West. By the force of history, the dictatorship, 
whose deficiencies were only partially evident in the heady days of 1978, 
reached the end of the line in December 1989.
75  Private Eye, 5 January 1989.
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